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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
ONAN FORD, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 890272-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of Aggravated 
Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-302 (1978). This Court has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court properly found that the 
showup identification procedure was not so suggestive so as to 
create a substantial likelihood of misidentification? 
2. Whether the trial court properly found that 
defendant was not prejudiced by the uncounseled pretrial contact 
between defendant and the County Attorney's Office? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-30(a) (1982)t 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be 
disregarded. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Onan Ford, was charged with Aggravated 
Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-302 (1978) (R. 1) Defendant was convicted as charged 
after a jury trial held on June 29 and 30, 1988, in the Second 
Judicial District Court, in and for Weber County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable David E. Roth, Judge, presiding (R. 284, 289). 
Defendant was sentenced by Judge Roth to a term of not less than 
five (5) years and which may be for life in the Utah State Prison 
(R. 289). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 11, 1988 at about 6:00 p.m., a man described 
as a black male entered the Gas-n-Go convenience store at 110 
Patterson Avenue in Ogden, Utah (R. 313, 321-22). The man was 
about five-feet-eight to nine inches tall, wearing a green 
jacket, red scarf, grey hat, light brown pants and white tennis 
shoes (R. 323). His hat was pulled down over his forehead and 
the scarf pulled up just under the nose (R. 324). John G'rarcia, 
the store attendant, observed that the man appeared too "bundled 
up" for the 40 to 45 degree weather and felt something was wrong 
(R. 321-22). The man asked Mr. Garcia for the restroom key and 
walked outside to the restroom door (R. 322). About ten minutes 
later, he returned, placed the restroom key on the counter, and 
left the store (R. 322). 
A few minutes later, the man re-entered the store, 
picked up a box of Reynolds Wrap, and placed it on the counter 
(R. 326). When Mr. Garcia asked if that was everything, the man 
pulled a small .22 caliber handgun from his right pocket and 
said, "Give me all the money you have got." (R. 327). Mr. 
Garcia responded, "if you want it, go for it" as he opened the 
cash register and activated a silent alarm (R. 328-30). The man 
switched the gun to his left hand, reached over the counter, and 
grabbed all the five, ten, and twenty dollar bills in the 
register (R. 330). He then exited the store and ran east on 
Patternson Avenue (R. 331). The Reynolds Wrap box was left on 
the counter (R. 332). 
Mr. Garcia immediately called the Ogden Police 
Department and gave a description of the robber and the direction 
of his getaway (R. 332). Officer Tony Huemiller of the Ogden 
City Police Department was nearby as the police dispatcher 
described the robber and his escape route on Patterson Avenue (R. 
360-61). Officer Huemiller proceeded to the scene, exited his 
vehicle, and began to look for footprints in the snow which might 
indicate the robber's path (R. 361-62). 
Huemiller observed fresh footprints in the snow going 
east in an alleyway between Patterson Avenue and 30th street (R. 
362). The length of the stride between steps indicated that the 
person who made the prints was running. Jd. Huemiller followed 
the footprints up the alleyway and across Lincoln Avenue until 
they went over a fence into a backyard Ici. Near the corner of a 
house, Huemiller found a green jacket, and a hat draped over some 
bushes (R. 364). Huemiller radioed for another officer to pick 
up the items and Huemiller continued the pursuit (R. 364). 
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Huemiller followed the footprints up the sidewalk, 
across several streets, and through a parking lot (R. 364-65). 
When the footprints crossed areas where the snow had been cleared 
or melted, Huemiller would fan out in a circular pattern until he 
could pick up the footprints again (R. 364-65). The footprints 
had a distinctive pattern of circles on the treads which appeared 
to be a tennis shoe pattern (R. 363). Huemiller observed an 
identical set of prints travelling parallel in the opposite 
direction Id. 
Eventually, the footprints went up a driveway and porch 
of a house located at 3237 Jefferson Avenue (R. 366-67). 
Huemiller knocked on the door of the house and a little girl 
answered (R. 367). The girl said that her father, Richard Jones, 
lived there, but that her father, mother, and some friends had 
gone to the store in a light blue vehicle (R. 368). Upon 
request, the girl gave Huemiller a picture of her father (R. 
369). 
After some time, a car pulled into the driveway and a 
black male and black female got out (R. 369). The male's shoe 
print did not match the footprints. Ici. However, a warrant 
check revealed an outstanding arrest warrant on the male, Edward 
Lucas, and he was arrested and transported to the Weber County 
Jail (R. 369). 
Soon after, a light blue car drove by with two black 
male and two black female occupants (R. 369). The car was 
stopped and the driver was identified as Richard Jones (R. 370). 
Mr. Jones was advised of his Miranda rights and taken to 
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Huemiller's vehicle (R. 370). Mr. Jones was wearing tennis 
shoes, but the pattern did not match the followed footprints (R. 
370). 
Defendant was in the rear driver's side seat of the 
stopped vehicle (R. 370, 396). He was wearing brown corduroy 
pants, a gray jacket, and white Nike tennis shoes (R. 371). The 
tread pattern on defendant's shoes matched the footprints (R. 
371). Defendant was placed in the passenger seat of a police 
vehicle and advised of his Miranda rights (R. 396). Defendant 
stated that he understood his rights and agreed to talk to the 
police (R. 396-97). 
Defendant produced a Utah driver's license as 
identification (R. 397), He was advised that footprints 
resembling the pattern on his shoes were observed leaving the 
scene of an aggravated robbery (R. 397). Defendant responded 
that he had nothing to do with a robbery and that he was with his 
friends all night 1^ *. He was informed that he was not under 
arrest and was asked to accompany the officer to the police 
station to clear up the matter. Id. 
Meanwhile, the items discarded in the bush were 
recovered by the police (R. 414-15). They included a jacket, a 
hat, and a handgun (R. 406-08, 414). In the left pocket of the 
jacket, $320.00 in cash was discovered in the following 
denominations: two $20.00 bills; eleven $10.00 bills; and 
thirty-four $5.00 bills (R. 406). An unspent .22 cartridge was 
found in the right jacket pocket (R. 407). An audit of the cash 
register revealed that approximately $322.00 was missing from the 
register (R. 333). 
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The victim/ Mr. Garcia, agreed to accompany Officer 
Gary Peterson to the police station to make a written statement 
(R. 334). During the statement, Officer Peterson was notified 
that a suspect was in custody and was present in the police 
station (R. 410). A showup was quickly arranged and Mr. Garcia 
was asked if he could identify the robber among three black males 
who had been placed in an office in the police station (R. 336-
37, 410-11). Without hesitation, Mr. Garcia positively 
identified defendant as the robber (R. 335-39). Defendant was 
arrested for aggravated robbery (R. 376). 
While being booked into the Weber County Jail, the 
booking officer asked defendant whether, "when [he] was in the 
store, did [he] think about getting caught and going to prison" 
(R. 377). Defendant responded, "Yeah, I thought about it." Id. 
He then paused and blurted out, "while I was laying in bed at 
home." 
Id. 
Detective Jerry Smith of the Ogden City Police 
Department recovered the Reynolds Wrap box which had been left on 
the store counter and dusted it for finger prints (R. 415). A 
left thumb print found on the Reynolds Wrap box was compared with 
defendant's left thumb print and found to be identical (R. 427-
28, 432). 
James Gaskill, Director of the Crime Laboratory at 
Weber State College, recovered hair samples from the hat which 
had been discarded with the jacket and gun (R. 137-38). Mr. 
Gaskill compared the hair samples with others taken from 
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defendant and determined that the hair samples taken from the hat 
were completely consistent with the hair samples from defendant 
(R. 445). He determined that there was only a one in five-
hundred chance that a person other than defendant was the source 
of the hair sample found in the hat. Id. 
Mr. Gaskill also determined that the picture of the 
suspect's shoe prints in the snow were consistent with the shoes 
worn by defendant (R. 147-48). He further concluded that less 
than 15% of the shoes sales in the Ogden area are size ten shoes 
as shown in the shoe print photograph (R. 455-56). 
At trial, defendant's girlfriend, Robin Bailey, 
testified that she was with defendant all day and night on the 
day of the robbery (R. 481). However, on cross-examination she 
admitted that she would do anything to keep defendant out of 
prison, including lying (R. 494). Richard Jones also testified 
that defendant was not out of his sight on the night of the 
robbery (R. 497-98, 515). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The facts and circumstances of this particular case 
establish that the showup identification procedure was not so 
suggestive as to create a substantial likelihood of 
misidentification. The victim had ample opportunity to view 
defendant face to face during the crime in a lighted store at the 
distance of two to three feet. The victim had good reason to pay 
a high degree of attention to defendant's characteristics and 
gave a detailed description of defendant to the police. The 
victim unhesitatingly identified defendant within a matter of two 
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to three hours after the crime. Finally, defendant was not under 
arrest at the time of the showup and had waived his right to 
counsel. Under these circumstances, the statutory lineup 
requirements were inapplicable and the showup identification was 
reliable. 
Defendant was not denied effective assistance of 
counsel and his defense was not prejudiced by the uncounseled 
pretrial contact between he and the County Attorney's Office. 
The trial prosecutor was shielded from any knowledge or 
information arising from the allegedly improper contact. 
Further, the eyewitness and physical evidence was so 
overwhelmingly incriminating that no substantial likelihood of a 
different result in the absence of the alleged error exists. 
Therefore, any error was harmless at best. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THE SHOWUP 
INDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE. 
Defendant claims that he was subjected to an improper 
police lineup which did not comply with statutory and 
constitutional requirements. Because of the claimed 
irregularities, he requests that the case be reversed and 
remanded for a new trial and that the victim's eyewitness 
identification be suppressed. Defendant's claim should be 
As authority, defendant cites Utah Code Ann. S 77-8-2 (1982) 
and U.S. Constitutional amendment VI in support of his due 
process claim. (Brief of App. at 16). Because defendant does 
not cite or argue seperate state constitutional grounds, this 
court should not consider defendant's claim under the Utah 
Constitution. See State v. Williams, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 48, 52 
n. 12 (S. Ct. 05/05/89). 
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rejected. 
The facts and circumstances of the present case 
establish that a showup, not a lineup, was conducted soon after 
the robbery. As set forth in the statement of facts above, the 
robbery occurred at a convenience store at about 6:00 p.m. (R. 
313, 321-22). Defendant entered the store and asked the 
attendant, John Garcia, for the restroom key (R. 322). Mr. 
Garcia noticed that defendant was too "bundled up" for the 
relatively mild winter weather (R. 321-22). He described 
defendant as about five-foot-eight or nine inches tall, wearing a 
green jacket, red scarf, grey hat, light brown pants, and white 
tennis shoes (R. 323). 
About ten minutes later, defendant returned the 
restroom key and left the store (R. 322). Defendant re-entered 
the store a few minutes later and picked up a box of Reynolds 
Wrap and placed it on the counter in front of Mr. Garcia (R. 
326). When Mr. Garcia asked defendant if that was everything, 
defendant pulled a small handgun from his right pocket and said 
"Give me all the money you have got." (R. 327). Mr. Garcia 
opened the cash register and said, "if you want it, go for it" 
(R. 328-30). Defendant reached over the counter towards Mr. 
Garcia and took the money out of the register (R. 330). 
Defendant then exited the store (R. 331). 
A silent alarm having been activated, the police 
quickly responded to the scene (R. 329, 403). Officer Gary 
Peterson arrived at 6:30 P.M. and obtained a detailed description 
of the robber from Mr. Garcia (R. 403-4). Mr. Garcia accompanied 
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Officer Peterson to the Ogden City Police Station to give a 
written statement regarding the crime (R. 839). About twenty to 
thirty minutes into the statement, Officer Peterson was notified 
that a suspect was in custody at the police station (R. 410, 
839). It was determined that an immediate showup would 
facilitate the ongoing investigation. Id. 
Meanwhile, footprints in the snow had been followed 
from the scene of the crime and defendant had been taken into 
custody for further questioning, but was not under arrest (R. 
362-67, 397). Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and 
agreed to talk to the police (R. 396-97). According to the 
police, defendant did not at any time request the presence of 
counsel (R. 818, 826, 830, 834, 841, 851, 853).2 
Because Mr. Garcia was present in the police station at 
the time defendant arrived for questioning, the police arranged a 
showup to determine whether defendant should be further detained 
(R. 824). Since two other black males had been detained at the 
same time, the police placed dbfendant in a room with the other 
detainees to assume a more accurate identification (R. 825). Mr. 
Garcia was permitted to view the three black males through a one-
way window (R. 375). Mr. Garcia immediately pointed to defendant 
and said "he is the one." ,Id. The police did not make any 
suggestive comments to Mr. Garcia regarding which person to 
identify (R. 336). The police urged Mr. Garcia to be cautious in 
his identification to assure accuracy (R. 374). Each detainee 
Defendant testified that he requested counsel every five to ten 
minutes which testimony was apparently disbelieved by the trial 
judge (R. 533). 
-10-
was asked to say, "give me all the money you have got." (R. 338). 
Again, Mr. Garcia immediately identified defendant's voice as 
that of the robber (R. 338). At trial, Mr. Garcia testified that 
he had no hesitation at all in identifying defendant in court as 
the robber (R. 339) . 
In determining whether the showup procedure in the 
present case was proper, a brief review of similar identification 
cases is helpful. In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), the 
United States Supreme Court discussed the due process 
considerations of out-of-court identifications. In Stovall, a 
woman had been stabbed 11 times by her assailant, ^d. at 295. 
The defendant was taken to the hospital where the victim had just 
undergone major surgery to save her life. .Id. The defendant was 
the only black man in the room, was handcuffed, and surrounded by 
five police officers. IdL From her hospital bed, the victim 
identified defendant as her assailant. Id. She also made a 
voice identification. Ici. At trial, she made an independent in 
court identification of defendant. Id. 
Applying a totality of the circumstances test, the high 
court ruled that exigent circumstances justified the suggestive 
showup. Jd. at 302. The need for immediate action made the usual 
police station lineup procedures impracticable Id. Thus, the 
defendant's due process rights were not violated Id, 
Later, in Neil v. Biqqers, 409 U.S. 188, (1972), the 
United States Supreme Court again addressed the subject of 
identification procedures. In Bigqers, a rape victim viewed her 
assailant for a considerable amount of time but could only give 
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police a "general description." Ri. at 200. She was shown 
several photographs (thirty to forty) and picked out a man as 
having features similar to those of her assailant, but could not 
positively identify any of the suspects. Ici. at 195. 
Approximately seven months after the commission of the crime, the 
victim was brought to the police station to view the defendant 
who was being held on another charge, ^d. The police were 
unable to construct a lineup due to the inability to locate 
persons who fit the defendant's unusual description. Id. 
Instead^ a showup was conducted which consisted of the defendant 
walking past the victim and saying "shut up or I'll kill you." 
Id. The victim positively identified the defendant as the 
assailant and he was subsequently convicted Ld. On appeal, the 
defendant claimed that the identification and the circumstances 
surrounding it failed to comport with due process requirements 
Id at 193. 
In rejecting the defendant's due process claim, the 
court found that the considerable opportunity of the rape victim 
to view her assailant during the commission of the crime was a 
substantial factor outweighing the seven month lapse of time 
between the crime and the showup. ]^d. at 200-01. The court 
noted that the victim's record for reliability was good where she 
had refused to identify numerous other suspects. Id. Weighing 
all the factors, the court found no substantial likelihood of 
misidentification. Id. 
Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court has permitted showup 
type identification procedures under a variety of circumstances. 
-12-
In State v. McGee, 24 Utah 2d 396f 473 P.2d 388 (1970), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the rules regarding the right to counsel 
at identification proceedings were inapplicable to non-lineup 
confrontations which occurred as a result of an immediate pursuit 
and apprehension of the suspect within minutes of the crime. Id. 
at 392. In McGee, the victim arrived at the police station 
within 15-20 minutes after the suspect was apprehended and the 
victim positively identified the suspect as the robber. Icl. at 
390. 
In State v. Wettstein, 28 Utah 2d 295, 501 P.2d 1084 
(1972), the Utah Supreme Court recited several factors which 
should be considered in evaluating the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding identification procedures: (1) was 
there justification for the procedure; (2) was there a necessity 
for using the type of identification employed; (3) were the 
circumstances of an urgent character; (4) was there a chance 
that the procedure utilized would lead to misidentification; (5) 
what opportunity and length of time did the witness have to 
observe the accused; and (6) how much time has elapsed from the 
time of the incident to the identification? Id. at 1087. The 
Wettstein court concluded that the somewhat suggestive 
photographic display shown to the witness within hours of the 
incident was not prone to misidentification. Ld. at 1087. 
The Utah Supreme Court also validated a showup 
procedure in State v. Allen, 29 Utah 2d 442, 511 P.2d 159 (1973) 
where two black males tied and bound two women in the back room 
of a downtown store and robbed them. Id. at 160. The victims 
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were able to free themselves and call the police. Ici. The 
police arrived quickly and detained two men fitting the 
description of the assailants just one and one-half blocks away 
from the crime scene, ^d. Within ten to fifteen minutes of the 
robbery, the police took the victims to where the two suspects 
were being detained and without any prompting, the victims 
identified the suspects as the robbers. Id. 
The Court explained that it was entirely proper to have 
the victims observe the men being detained. J^ci. A prompt showup 
procedure soon after a crime is committed is preferred. If the 
person being detained cannot be identified as the assailant, then 
the detainee may be allowed to proceed on his way. Ici. Further, 
"[a] victim of a robbery should not be denied an opportunity to 
see the robber until [his or] her memory might fade and thus be 
less reliable." Ld. To view a suspect immediately after the 
crime enables a victim to be more positive in making a true and 
correct identification. Ijd. The "greater the elapse of time, 
the greater would be the chance for a misidentification.M Id. 
It is thus a safety factor to the innocent to be seen "while the 
details of dress and features are fresh in the minds [sic] of the 
victim." Id, 
In State v. Ek, 526 P.2d 359 (Utah 1974), the victim of 
a robbery was shown a picture of the defendant and was permitted 
to view him in a hospital. Ici. at 359. The victim identified 
the defendant as one of the robbers Ld. The Court noted that at 
the time of the showup, no charge had been filed against the 
defendant and that the officers were merely attempting to 
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ascertain who committed the crime. J^ d. Accordingly, the Court 
found that the showup procedure was proper to secure the 
identification of the robber. Id. 
Similarly, in State v. demons, 580 P.2d 601 (Utah 
1978), a rape victim contacted the police soon after the assault. 
Id. at 602. She described her assailant as black, clean-shaven 
with a puffy afro hairdo, and wearing a brown leather jacket. 
Id. The police responded immediately and detained two suspects 
nearby, ^d. The victim was taken to the first detainee where 
she told police that he was not the man who had assaulted her 
Id. She was then taken to the other detainee where she 
positively identified him as the rapist. Ij-I* The Court again 
upheld the showup procedure as a helpful and accurate method of 
determining whether a suspect is or is not the perpetrator of the 
offense. Id. 
In State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980), the 
Utah Supreme Court further clarified the test to be applied to 
identification procedures: 
Police identification procedures such as 
photograph displays, lineups, showups, and 
the like, do not deny the accused due process 
of law unless, under a totality of the 
circumstances, they are so unnecessarily 
suggestive and conducive to irreparable 
mistaken identification as to deny the 
accused a fair trial. Where an 
identification procedure, even though 
suggestive, does not give rise to a 
substantial likelihood of misidentification# 
no due process violation has occurred. In 
determining the reliability of the 
identification under the totality of the 
circumstances, the court must also consider 
[1] the opportunity of the witness to view 
the criminal at the time of the crime, [2] 
the witness's degree of attention, [3] the 
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accuracy of any prior description of the 
criminal, [4] the level of certainty 
demonstrated during the identification 
procedure, [5] and the time between the crime 
and the identification. 
Id. at 357 (numerical designations added). Thus, the five factor 
McCumber test set forth above must be applied to a totality of 
the circumstance due process review of an identification 
procedure. 
In State v. Poteet, 692 P.2d 760 (Utah 1984), the Court 
distinguished between the familiar "lineup" procedures 
contemplated by Utah Code Ann. § 77-8-1, et seq., and a simple 
"showup" procedure. Ld. at 763. In Poteet, the police officer 
stood the suspects along a chain link fence and permitted the 
assault victim to view the suspects. Ijd. at 763. The victim, 
who had been badly beaten, identified three suspects as his 
assailants. Ijd. In upholding the showup procedure, the court 
emphasized that the appellant had been advised of his right to 
counsel and voluntarily varied it prior to the showup. 
Considering the circumstances surrounding the showup, the court 
found the identification evidence admissable. Id. 
Applying the case law to facts of the present case, the 
showup evidence was admissible. First, the victim, Mr. Garcia, 
had ample opportunity to view defendant face to face in a lighted 
store at the distance of two to three feet (R. 343). The victim 
viewed defendant as he asked for the restroom key, as he returned 
the key, as he re-entered the store, and as he pointed a gun at 
the victim and asked for the money in the cash register (R. 322, 
326, 327). 
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Second, the victim viewed defendant under circumstances 
which caused the victim to pay a high degree of attention to 
defendant's dress and features. Third, the victim's description 
of the robber was detailed and accurate. The victim identified 
the robber as a black male, five-feet-eight to nine inches tall, 
wearing a green jacket, red scarf, grey hat, light brown pants, 
and white tennis shoes (R. 323). 
Fourth, the victim's level of certainty during the 
identification procedure was immediate and without hesitation (R. 
375). The victim identified both defendant's features and voice 
(R. 375, 338). No suggestive comments were made by the police 
and defendant was given the benefit of having two other black 
males included in the showup (R. 336, 375, 825). 
Finally, the lapse of time between the crime and the 
showup was brief. The victim called the police at about 6:30 
p.m. immediately after the crime (R 332) • Officer Huemiller 
responded, followed the suspects footprints in the snow, and 
arrived at the suspect's residence within fifteen minutes (R. 
360, 362, 391). Within a matter of minutes, defendant and three 
others were detained when their vehicle approached the residence 
(R. 369-70). Defendant and Mr. Jones were asked to accompany the 
officers to the police station for further questioning (R. 371). 
Soon after arriving at the police station, the showup was 
conducted and the victim positively identified defendant as the 
robber (R. 372-75). 
Another factor to be considered under the totality of 
the circumstances is that defendant was informed of his Miranda 
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rights, acknowledged his understanding, and voluntarily waived 
those rights prior to the showup (R. 396-97) Contrary to 
defendant's claim, he did not request an attorney before or 
during the showup (R. 818, 826, 830, 834, 841, 851, 853). 
Further, defendant was not under arrest at the time of the showup 
(R. 397). 
Based upon the evidence, the trial court found that the 
identification procedure was a showup, not a lineup, and that 
there was nothing to indicate any possibility of 
misidentification. (Transcript dated June 7th and 8th, 1988 at 
pp. 9-10). The court explained that simply putting two other 
individuals with defendant does not make it a lineup. Id. 
Rather, the additional persons were included for defendant's 
benefit. Id. 
Accordingly, this Court should find that under the 
totality of the circumstances, the showup identification 
procedure was not unnecessarily suggestive or conducive to an 
irreparable mistaken identification. Further, this court should 
find that the statutory procedures for a formal lineup were 
inapplicable under the circumstances and that in any event, 
defendant waived his right to counsel. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
PRE-TRIAL MOTION TO DISMISS FOR PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT. 
Defendant claims that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel prior to trial due to prosecutorial 
misconduct. Specifically, defendant claims that the pros€»cution 
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had an improper contact with him, in the absence of his counsel, 
during a pretrial "sting operation" initiated by defendant and in 
which defendant cooperated. Defendant's claim should be 
considered meritless. 
Prior to trial, defendant contacted the Weber County 
Attorney's Office to disclose that he had information regarding a 
criminal case against his cellmate (R. 547, 552-53). 
Subsequently, an agreement was reached between defendant and the 
County Attorney's Office that defendant would cooperate in a 
"sting operation" designed to recover stolen property in 
defendant's cellmate's case (R. 285-86)(See Addendum "A", Letter 
of Agreement). In exchange, the prosecution agreed to take no 
position on defendant's sentence, to take no position on the gun 
enhancement charge, to write a letter to the Board of Pardon 
describing defendant's cooperation, and to do everything in it's 
power to assure that defendant would serve any possible sentence 
in a facility other than the Utah State Prison. Ici. The 
agreement was reached without the knowledge of defendant's 
attorney, Merlin Calver (R. 646-47). 
During the "sting operation," defendant made allegedly 
incriminating statements regarding his case which statements were 
recorded by police officers monitoring the operation by a body 
wire placed on defendant (R. 612-14). When defendant later 
disclosed to his attorney that he had been secretly working with 
the police and the prosecution, defendant's attorney filed a bar 
complaint against the prosecuting attorneys involved and withdrew 
from the case (R. 645). 
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As a result, defendant moved to dismiss the charges or 
to recuse the Weber County Attorney's Office (R. 57-58, (28-29). 
An evidentiary hearing was held prior to trial on defendant's 
motions. The evidence established that the prosecuting attorney 
in defendant's case had been shielded from any knowledge of the 
substance of defendant's allegedly incriminating statements 
during the sting operation (R. 635, 677-78, 707). Based on this 
evidence, Judge Roth ruled that defendant's case had not been 
compromised or prejudiced in any way as a result of the 
uncounseled sting operation (Transcript of June 7th and 8th 1988 
at p. 11). He specifically ruled that defendant had not been 
denied effective assistance of counsel. Lei- Accordingly, he 
denied defendant's motion to dismiss and motion to recuse and set 
the matter for trial. Id. at 12. 
It is well-established that a defendant must show some 
degree of demonstrable prejudice in order to successfully argue 
error based on prosecutorial misconduct. State v. Lafferty, 749 
P.2d 1239, 1255 (Utah 1988). Rule 30(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure provides that any "error, defect, irregularity 
or variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a 
party shall be disregarded." Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-30(a) 
(1982). In the absence of showing of prejudice, any error must 
be deemed harmless. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987). 
Error is not harmless if a review of the record persuades the 
court that without the error there was Ma reasonable likelihood 
of a more favorable result for the defendant. State v. Fontana, 
680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984). 
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In the present case, defendant claims that his 
attorney, Mr. Calver, was rendered ineffective as a result of the 
claimed prosecutional misconduct. He does not claim that Mr. 
Calver acted ineffectively. Nor does he claim that Mr. Calver 
was precluded somehow in preparing a defense. In fact, Mr. 
Calver had not entered his appearance until after defendant's 
preliminary hearing and had simply filed several pre-trial 
motions which were subsequently pursued by succeeding counsel (R. 
645). Defendant simply claims that Mr. Calver was not present 
during or informed of the sting operation. 
Assuming that the contact between defendant and the 
prosecution was improper, defendant fails to state how the result 
of his trial would have been different in the absence of the 
contact. The evidence shows that the prosecutor at trial was 
shielded from any knowledge or information disclosed in the sting 
operation (R. 605, 677-78, 707). There is no evidence that 
defendant was prejudiced in preparing his defense or that his 
defense was made ineffective. Finally, the eyewitness and 
physical evidence was so overwhelmingly incriminating that there 
is no likelihood that the outcome of the trial could have been 
affected by any pretrial contact between defendant and the 
prosecution. See State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1257 (Utah 
1988). Accordingly, this court should conclude that the claimed 
pretrial irregularities were harmless at best. 
*JI _ 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, respondent requests that 
defendant's conviction be affirmed, 
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